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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






JEROME JUNIOR WASHINGTON,  




SUPERINTENDENT GILMORE; LIEUTENANT  TROUT; SERGEANT DEMASKE; 
UNIT MANAGER  LACKEY; C.O. ULIZIO, JOHN DOE 1, 2, 3, 4 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-19-cv-01461) 








JEROME JUNIOR WASHINGTON,  




CAPTAIN CRUM; LT. TROUT; U.M. LACKEY; MAJOR BAZUS; CERT TEAM 
JOHN DOES 1 TO 12 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-19-cv-01460) 





Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
August 20, 2020 
Before: JORDAN, KRAUSE, and MATEY, Circuit Judges 
 







Pro se appellant Jerome Washington appeals the District Court’s orders denying 
his requests to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) and dismissing his actions.  For the 
reasons detailed below, we will summarily vacate the District Court’s orders and remand 
for further proceedings.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
Washington filed two separately docketed prisoner-civil-rights complaints along 
with requests to proceed IFP.  A Magistrate Judge recommended that the District Court 
deny the requests to proceed IFP on the ground that Washington had already accrued 
three strikes under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and had not shown that he was in imminent 
danger of physical harm.  See W.D. Pa. Civ. No. 2-19-cv-01460, ECF No. 2; W.D. Pa. 
Civ. No. 2-19-cv-01461, ECF No. 2.  The District Court approved and adopted the 
reports and recommendations.  See W.D. Pa. Civ. No. 2-19-cv-01460, ECF Nos. 9 & 10; 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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W.D. Pa. Civ. No. 2-19-cv-01461, ECF No. 9 & 10.1  Washington then filed notices of 
appeal in each case.  In this Court, he has requested permission to proceed IFP.   
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 
F.3d 307, 311 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc) (holding that an order denying leave to proceed 
IFP is immediately appealable).  We exercise plenary review.  See Ball v. Famiglio, 726 
F.3d 448, 455 n.11 (3d Cir. 2013). 
We grant Washington’s applications to proceed IFP on appeal and, for the same 
reasons, will vacate the District Court’s orders denying his IFP applications.  Washington 
is clearly financially eligible to proceed IFP; he has no income and a negative balance in 
his prison account.  See generally Walker v. People Express Airlines, Inc., 886 F.2d 598, 
601 (3d Cir. 1989).  The District Court concluded that Washington has three strikes and 
is thus barred from proceeding IFP.  The IFP statute provides— 
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a 
civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or 
more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought 
an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the 
grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of 
serious physical injury. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).   
 
The District Court concluded that Washington accrued strikes in four cases: 
Washington v. Weiner, E.D. Pa. Civ. A. No. 16-cv-02487; Washington v. Gilmore, W.D. 
Pa. Civ. A. No. 18-cv-00337; Washington v. Colgan, W.D. Pa. Civ. A. No. 18-cv-00341; 
 
1 The reports and recommendations and orders are substantively identical.   
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and Washington v. Gilmore, W.D. Pa. Civ. A. No. 18-cv-00343.  The three Western 
District of Pennsylvania actions were disposed of on similar grounds.  In Civ. A. No. 18-
00343, the Court dismissed one defendant pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 
ordered “that the remaining claim in this case is dismissed without prejudice because it is 
duplicative to claim seven at Civil Action No. 17-988.”  ECF No. 42.  In Civ. A. Nos. 18-
00337 and 18-00341, the Court granted one defendant’s motion to dismiss, dismissed one 
party pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)–(iii), and ordered “that the remaining claim in this 
case is dismissed without prejudice because it is duplicative to claim nine at Civil Action 
No. 17-988.”  W.D. Pa. Civ. A. No. 18-00337, ECF No. 55; W.D. Pa. Civ. A. No. 18-
00341, ECF No. 53. 
We conclude that these dismissals do not qualify as strikes under § 1915(g).  We 
have explained that “a strike under § 1915(g) will accrue only if the entire action or 
appeal is (1) dismissed explicitly because it is ‘frivolous,’ ‘malicious,’ or ‘fails to state a 
claim’ or (2) dismissed pursuant to a statutory provision or rule that is limited solely to 
dismissals for such reasons, including (but not necessarily limited to) 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1915A(b)(1), 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), or Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.”  Byrd v. Shannon, 715 F.3d 117, 126 (3d Cir. 2013); see also 
Ball, 726 F.3d at 463–64.  
The Western District orders do not satisfy this rule because the cases were 
dismissed in part as duplicative.  See Byrd, 715 F.3d at 125 (explaining that “§ 1915(g) 
requires that a prisoner’s entire action or appeal be dismissed on enumerated grounds in 
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order for the dismissal to count as a strike”).  In dismissing the actions in part as 
duplicative, the District Court did not use the words “frivolous,” “malicious,” or “fails to 
state a claim,” so the orders do not satisfy that part of the Byrd rule.  See id. at 126 
(stating that “the first category of our new rule requires that the terms ‘frivolous,’ 
‘malicious,’ or ‘fails to state a claim’ be explicitly stated for the dismissal to constitute a 
strike”).  Nor was this part of the dismissal “pursuant to a statutory provision or rule that 
is limited solely to dismissals for such reasons.”  Id.  The District Court did not identify 
the basis for its authority to dismiss this claim as duplicative, but it is best understood as 
an exercise of the Court’s inherent power.  See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. 
United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976); Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 70 (3d Cir. 
1977) (en banc); Sacerdote v. Cammack Larhette Advisors, LLC, 939 F.3d 498, 504 (2d 
Cir. 2019).  However, not every dismissal based on a court’s inherent powers is due to 
the action’s being frivolous or malicious or failing to state a claim.  For instance, courts 
have the inherent authority to dismiss an action for failure to prosecute, see Chambers v. 
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991), which does not fall within any of those categories, 
see Butler v. Dep’t of Justice, 492 F.3d 440, 443 (D.C. Cir. 2007).  Thus, these three 
dismissals do not fall within Byrd’s second category, either.2 
 
2 The Magistrate Judge reasoned that “[a]lthough the undersigned did not specifically 
recommend dismissal of the duplicative claims in these three cases as malicious, if it 
were determined that such dismissals did not count as strikes, it would appear that all a 
litigious plaintiff would have to do to avoid accruing a strike is simply include in a 
complaint a duplicative claim that requires dismissal without prejudice.”  See W.D. Pa. 
Civ. No. 2-19-cv-01460, ECF No. 2 at 4 n.4; W.D. Pa. Civ. No. 2-19-cv-01461, ECF No. 
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Washington is thus financially eligible to proceed IFP and does not have three 
strikes.  We therefore grant his applications to proceed IFP in this Court, vacate the 
District Court’s orders denying his IFP applications and dismissing his actions, and 
remand for further proceedings.3 
  
 
2 at 4 n.4.  However, that concern is misplaced.  A Court may choose to dismiss a 
duplicative claim as frivolous or malicious, see Higgins v. Carpenter, 258 F.3d 797, 801 
(8th Cir. 2001) (per curiam); Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 
1995); Pittman v. Moore, 980 F.2d 994, 994–95 (5th Cir. 1993)—and it probably should 
do so if the plaintiff includes such a claim solely as a ploy to avoid accruing a strike as 
the Magistrate Judge envisioned.  But that is not what happened here.  These dismissals 
do not count as strikes because the District Court did not explicitly characterize the 
claims as malicious or frivolous as required by Byrd, not because duplicative claims are 
not susceptible to dismissal on those grounds. 
3 The Magistrate Judge also noted that “[i]t is unresolved in this Circuit whether the 
dismissal of certain claims without prejudice results in a strike.”  The Supreme Court has 
since explained that “[a] dismissal of a suit for failure to state a claim counts as a strike, 
whether or not with prejudice.”  Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S. Ct. 1721, 1727 (2020). 
